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ABSTRACT
On 1 January 2005, all stock exchange listed companies in the European
Union (EU) began using International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
written by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). This arti-
cle argues that the IASB’s introduction of fair value accounting reflects and
reinforces changed relations of production in which the financial sector in-
creasingly dominates the productive sector, nationally institutionalized eco-
nomic systems are undermined, and new forms of economic appropriation
are validated. As a private body, the IASB has been able to rapidly introduce
the fair value paradigm with little public debate outside specialized finan-
cial circles. In contrast to more functionalist views, this article argues that
accounting standards are inherently political. Accounting numbers provide
some of the key economic anchors around which social relations are struc-
tured. Accounting techniques cannot be reduced to questions of efficiency
since they set out to quantify and compare things which, by their very nature,
are neither quantifiable nor directly comparable.
KEYWORDS
Accounting; International Accounting Standards Board; private authority;
capital; financialization; varieties of capitalism
1. INTRODUCTION
On 1 January 2005, all stock exchange listed companies in the European
Union (EU) began using International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS)1 written by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).
The adoption of IFRS in the EU marks a critical turning point in two
regards.
Whereas accounting standards in the EU have previously been set at a
national level by a combination of public and private actors, the process will
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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
now be managed internationally by a London-based organisation whose
parent foundation is a private company incorporated in the US state of
Delaware. To what extent are we therefore witnessing a transfer of author-
ity from national to global and from public to private?
There are also important substantive changes taking place in the stan-
dards themselves—it is not simply a question of harmonisation and
ironing-out a few minor discrepancies between the old national standards.
Intense controversy surrounds the new standards, as any reader of the fi-
nancial media could confirm. More is to come: as Sir David Tweedie, head
of the IASB, put it in an interview with the Financial Times ‘There will be
blood all over the streets’ (FT, 2004b).
The question is: whose blood? Accounting is a system for measuring
economic activity and therefore, in an economic world characterized by
division and specialisation of labour, it is an important and necessary social
practice. Resolution of social conflict over resources is not simply recorded
by accounting after the event; rather, accounting numbers themselves form
the basis for such resolutions. Accounting impacts the lives of everyone in
society, even (or perhaps especially) those who know very little about the
subject and have never set eyes on a financial statement. Looking only at the
substance of accounting standards (as often done by accounting scholars)
or only at their mode of governance (the typical political science perspec-
tive) is inadequate. In this article we aim to do both. First we explain how
newly instituted accounting techniques for defining and valuing business
assets, chief among them fair value accounting (FVA), are integral to the
ongoing reorientation of the international political economy. Second we
argue that although the IASB is not the root cause of this reorientation, it
has nevertheless served to codify the political economic changes through
the introduction of new accounting standards. The IASB has been able to
do this rapidly and largely unchallenged because of the particular form of
transnational private authority which it represents.
Our analysis of accounting standards and their setting is different from
that of practitioners and mainstream accounting scholars who assess stan-
dards in terms of their efficiency, and whether they reduce principal-agent
conflict and information asymmetries. After critically reviewing these effi-
ciency arguments we offer an alternative comprising three complementary
perspectives from the field of political economy. We support these per-
spectives with empirics from three specific areas of accounting impacted
by IFRS. Questioning the portrayal of FVA in principal-agent terms, we
instead argue that the new standards represent a shift in power from pro-
duction to finance. From a Varieties of Capitalism perspective, we show
how harmonized IASB accounting standards favour the Anglo-Saxon over
the Rhenish model. From the perspective of capital theory, we demonstrate
how the standards institutionalise new forms of assets which herald an era
of intensified economic restructuring.
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Our argument is mainly relevant for three literatures: (1) In context of
the current discussion about comparative corporate governance and the
varieties of capitalism (Erturk et al., 2004; Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005; Hall
and Soskice, 2001; O’Sullivan, 2003), our article offers a first assessment
of current changes in international accounting regulation. Transparent ac-
counting is a pre-requisite for effective corporate governance, but the im-
plications of its international harmonisation for different systems of cap-
italism have hardly been considered until now, although some observers
argue that the accountancy profession is a major driving force of recent
reforms in corporate governance regulation (Dewing and Russell, 2004:
310–1). (2) From a more general political economy perspective, accounting
also plays a crucial role within current discussions about the changing na-
ture of capitalism, in particular about the shift from industrial to finance
capitalism or from corporate liberalism to neo-liberalism (Overbeek, 2005;
Van Apeldoorn, 2004). Notably, the rise of institutional investors (Harms,
1998; Langley, 2004) has led to an increasing focus on relations between the
financial and productive sectors. A substantial shift in accounting method-
ologies can tilt the balance between the two, as we will demonstrate later. (3)
International accounting regulation is one of the most fascinating cases of
private authority in international affairs (Biersteker and Hall, 2002; Cutler
et al., 1999; Sinclair, 1994), given that the rulings of a private body are be-
ing made obligatory for more than 7,000 listed companies in the EU alone.
Although accounting has been mentioned frequently in the literature on
the increasing role of private actors in global governance (Braithwaite and
Drahos, 2000: 121–2; Germain, 2004: 15; Sassen, 1999: 413–4; Strange, 1996:
135–46; Woods, 2002: 31;) it is rarely studied in much detail and few political
economists analyse the substance of what is being regulated.
2. CURRENT CHANGES IN THE SUBSTANCE OF
ACCOUNTING REGULATION
We argue that the most significant change which International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) bring to accounting is in the role and valuation
of assets. This change presents itself in two forms: Fair value accounting
(FVA) and the balance sheet approach. In this section we offer an introduc-
tion to these concepts. For readers with no prior specific accounting knowl-
edge, our appendix briefly defines some basic accounting terms and relates
them to the political-economic issues with which this paper is concerned.
As financial magnitudes, asset values are the key quantitative anchors
around which capitalism is organized. The way in which assets are valued
and defined is thus a central parameter in socio-economic relations. Ac-
counting is not the sole authority for valuing assets but, by institutionalis-
ing and codifying methods for doing so, it is an extremely influential refer-
ence that both reflects and reinforces broader social changes—phenomena
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that we examine more closely in Section 3 of this article. Whereas account-
ing traditionally valued business assets at their historic cost, IFRS now
applies fair value accounting (FVA) techniques to an increasing range of
assets. Set against historic-cost accounting, FVA represents a significant
shift in thinking because it removes the direct link between what a firm
paid for an asset and the value the firm attributes to that asset in its statutory
financial statements. The IASB defines fair vale as ‘. . . the amount for which
an asset could be exchanged or a liability settled between knowledgeable,
willing parties in an arm’s length transaction’ (IASB 1999—IAS19, Section
7: definitions). Fair-values are thus closely related to market-values. How-
ever, some caution should be exercised in equating fair value directly with
market value since not all assets are traded on active markets and so some-
times a model is used to reach a ‘synthetic’ market value. This practise
has given rise to much debate among accounting scholars about how to
calculate a fair-value (see for example Barth and Landsman, 1995; Gray,
2003). Likewise, from the practitioner’s side, global accounting firms have
highlighted how the term ‘fair value’ is misused by accounting regulators
to cover a wide range of valuation models, of which a direct market value
is only one (Ernst & Young, 2005).
The measurement of any asset involves discounting the future into a
present value. Someone will only pay for an asset if they expect it to yield
future income, whether in money or in kind. As Pixley (2004: 141) puts it,
‘Value is future-oriented. If accountants stuck firmly to making statements
about the past, they could not value fixed capital’. Since the future is in-
herently unknowable, any precise value placed on an asset is ultimately
an estimation of the future, rather than a simple fact. This is true of both
historic cost and fair value accounting, with the main difference between
them being the timing of the estimation, and who does it. Under historic
cost accounting, the estimation is made in the past by the buyer and seller,
and validated by a transaction. Under fair value accounting the estimation
is made today by the market, or by an auditor modelling the market, and
is not necessarily validated by a transaction. Uncertainty is unavoidable in
both types of accounting.2 As Pixley asserts, ‘uncertainty is never settled
by bookkeeping, only allayed or repressed’ (ibid, 2004: 138).
Nevertheless, the IASB and the US Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB), which are committed to a long-term convergence project
(IASB, 2002), clearly believe that the FVA approach to such inherent uncer-
tainty is, in many cases, superior to historic cost. Both regulators are keen
to extend FVA to more areas of accounting, as evidenced by the FASB’s
publication of its exposure draft ‘Fair Value Measurements’ (FASB, 2004),
which the IASB has also embraced (Ernst & Young, 2005), proposing a
framework for measuring fair value that would apply broadly to financial
and non-financial assets and liabilities. The document lays out a ‘fair value
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hierarchy’ (FASB, 2004: paragraphs 14–24) which gets around the lack of
active markets for some assets by allowing the modelling of fair value on
the basis of expected future income streams—in other words simulating
what a rational market participant would do.
The use of FVA techniques for asset valuation is all the more important
given that the IASB also promotes the so-called balance sheet approach,
whereby corporate performance is increasingly judged from the perspec-
tive of asset values on the balance sheet as opposed to cash-flows on the
income statement (see appendix for definitions). As such, assets and lia-
bilities rather than operating income become the reference point for calcu-
lating financial results (Barker, 2003). Taken to its limit, the balance sheet
approach is conceptually equivalent to the proposition that profit can be
expressed in terms of changes in wealth. The IASB refers to this extreme
version of the balance sheet approach as ‘comprehensive income’ and, at
the time of writing, had a special project led by Dr Barker investigating
how to apply comprehensive income to accounting (IASB, 2004b). One of
the weaknesses of the balance sheet approach is that, when combined with
FVA, it leads to an increased volatility of profits caused not by core busi-
ness activities but instead by re-measurements of asset values (Bernstein,
2002). This weakness is recognized by standard setters who propose a new
kind of income statement, whereby profit is expressed as a range rather
than a single figure, and enough supporting data is disclosed for users
to subsequently make their own calculations according to their particular
preferences (Barker, 2003: 21, but also Damant, 2003b: 12).
It should be noted that both FVA and the balance sheet approach are
part of an accounting trend with roots beyond the IASB. Nevertheless, the
IASB represents a grouping of (mostly Anglo-Saxon and English speak-
ing) accounting specialists who strongly support both changes, and who
have had considerable success getting them incorporated into new ac-
counting standards. Of the two changes FVA is the more substantial. IASB
standards bring FVA to many important areas of accounting including
intangible assets (IFRS3), the recognition of financial assets and liabili-
ties (IAS32), the measurement of financial assets and liabilities (IAS39),
agricultural commodities (IAS41), and pensions (IAS19). The first three
of these are analysed in Section 3. The balance sheet approach plays a
supporting role to FVA since it increases the extent to which profits are
driven by changes in asset values. So far, however, the IASB has not is-
sued any explicit rulings on comprehensive income or the balance sheet
approach (FT, 2005b), but rather has incorporated the concept implicitly
into FVA standards which require asset value adjustments to show up in
the profit and loss result. For this reason the analysis which follows is
focussed on FVA and the concomitant shift away from traditional historic-
cost accounting.
563
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
2:
46
 2
1 
Ju
ne
 2
01
1
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
3. THE MEANING OF FVA: THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES
3.1 FVA: The Efficiency Perspective
Mainstream analyses of accounting standards, written both by practi-
tioners and accounting scholars (but with notable exceptions in critical
accounting—see Section 3.4), generally assume a functionalist perspective.
Mirroring the functionalist notion of a rational-bureaucratic technocracy
emerging as a benevolent social driving force (Mitrany, 1975), the IASB is
described as having ‘emerged . . . to establish high quality International Fi-
nancial Reporting Standards and to engineer [international] convergence’
(Zeff, 2002: 43).
In particular, the availability of timely and reliable information about
firms’ finances is seen as a functional requirement of an economic system
which is supposed to efficiently allocate social resources through capital
markets. To operate efficiently, capital markets need to predict a firm’s
future income streams based on the resources which it controls. Efficiency
proponents of FVA argue that traditional historic-cost based accounts are
inadequate for this purpose (Barlev and Haddad, 2003; Damant, 2003a).
Rather than giving an accurate picture of the resources that a firm controls,
historic-cost accounts simply tell management’s story about what they
have done with investor’s money, the so-called ‘stewardship’ approach
(see, for example, Berry, 1999). Such accounts are said to contain irrelevant
data because they are based on the initial values of assets and liabilities
which are often very different from their current economic values (Damant,
2003a).
The IASB itself also tends to present IFRS and FVA in terms of increas-
ing market efficiencies. In explaining his organisation’s application of FVA,
the vice-chairman of the IASB makes his case plainly: ‘[it is] not our objec-
tive to get away from economic reality . . . There is nothing more real than
the value of an asset today’ (FT, 2005a). Historic-cost accounting practises
are seen as distorting this ‘economic reality’ because they enable profit-
smoothing via the under-reporting of asset values, which in turn leads to a
misallocation of resources (Ball, 2004). FVA techniques, on the other hand,
are said to give capital market investors the most direct and objective data
upon which to base their resource allocation decisions. This corresponds
with the stated aim of the IASB’s constitution, which does not mention the
stewardship function anywhere and instead gives prominence to the pre-
dictive uses of financial statements that ‘help participants in the world’s
capital markets and other users make economic decisions’ (IASB, 2004a).
Wherever FVA is applied, proponents assume its transparency will im-
ply fewer surprises for investors and so less uncertainty and lower risk.
Since mainstream finance theories assert that lower risk translates into
lower returns being demanded by investors, the transparency of FVA is
564
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expected to reduce the cost of capital for society at large. FVA can thus
be sold by its proponents as a cornerstone for societal progress: ‘. . . even a
small improvement in efficiency of the major capital markets will lead to
an enormous increase in wealth . . . the benefit to even the poorest mem-
bers of society and the poorest countries will be very significant indeed’
(Damant, 2003a: 12).
However, even among those who see accounting standards largely in
terms of technical efficiency, not all share such a rosy view of FVA. Bernstein
(2002) says that the choice between historic cost and FVA amounts to a
choice between economic reality and comparability. While FVA accounts
might better reflect current economic reality and might theoretically have
more predictive power, he claims that the number of complex and subjec-
tive assessments required to produce an FVA financial statement means
that the results are not comparable between different time periods or
between different firms. Barth and Landsman (1995) highlight practical
problems with FVA, explaining that in an ideal-type world of perfect and
complete markets a fair value balance sheet would reflect all relevant in-
formation but, under more realistic assumptions, fair values are poorly
defined.
To sum-up: Those who question FVA from within the mainstream ef-
ficiency perspective of accounting claim that the paradigm introduces as
many arbitrary judgements into financial statements as it purports to re-
move from them. So far they appear to be losing the argument, although
this may change now that the big accounting firms are becoming more
openly critical of the way the IASB is proceeding with FVA (see for ex-
ample Ernst & Young, 2005). In contrast, those supporting FVA do so on
the basis that markets have become more sophisticated in their ability to
process (and price) detailed financial information. It is argued that share-
holders no longer need managers to interpret economic reality for them;
much better to get the raw data and do it themselves. Management should
focus on strategy while shareholders should be left to evaluate that strat-
egy. Proponents claim that an FVA balance sheet will focus shareholders’
attention on whether managers are getting the best possible returns on the
assets they control, causing a substantial change in the latter’s perception
of their duties to the former (Barlev and Haddad, 2003). As such, FVA ac-
counting standards are expected to increase management efficiency and
reduce the principal-agent conflict.
3.2 Where is the Principal? Power to Fund Managers
and the Financial Sector
It is our contention that the efficiency-based arguments presented in the
preceding section make a fundamental conceptual error at the outset: FVA
supporters portray the paradigm in principal-agent terms, claiming that
565
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it reduces principal-agent conflict and increases overall efficiency. In this
section we demonstrate why such an analysis is mistaken: First we present
FVA as an agent–agent struggle played out between different economic
sectors; second we use the example of a specific FVA standard to analyse
this struggle in terms of finance and production, and show that it has less
clear-cut implications for efficiency.
In summarizing their analysis of FVA’s effects on the management of the
firm, Barlev and Haddad (2003) make the following claim:
We may expect a change in the perception of financial statements by
shareholders. In preparing historic-cost based financial statements,
managers have a dominant power over the process. They are able
to manage income and to ‘window-dress’ the statement of financial
position. Hence, the manager’s voice is clearly heard and is highly
reflected. Shareholders must, therefore, be tuned to the manager’s
voice. The FVA paradigm reduces the manager’s voice in favour of
the market’s voice [which] takes its power from . . . fair values, which
are independent of the manager’s influence. (Barlev and Haddad,
2003: 384)
In short, FVA shifts power from managers to markets, which benefits
shareholders. In this analysis, shareholders are the principals, managers
the agents, and the market is a mechanism for obtaining the most rele-
vant asset values. However, the ultimate owners of shares do not—for the
most part—actively participate in trading them and allocating their capi-
tal. Instead, that task falls to investment funds, pension funds, insurance
companies and the proprietary trading desks of large international banks.
Thus, we should replace the term ‘shareholder’ in the earlier citation with
‘trader/fund manager’. Similarly, market-based asset prices do not repre-
sent some sort of abstract social equilibrium, but rather they represent the
actions of marginal buyers and sellers, driven by the views of dominant
market analysts and pundits who do not necessarily make the long-term
calculations which reflect broader societal interests. Thus, we replace the
term ‘market’ with the term ‘financial analyst’. For clarity we also replace
‘manager’ with the more precise term ‘enterprise manager’.
We now get a different interpretation of Barlev and Haddad’s observa-
tion: Under FVA, financial analysts gain power and traders/fund man-
agers pay more attention to them; enterprise managers lose power. All
three are agents of one kind or another. Most of the real principals in the
financial system—i.e. investors, savers, pensioners and future pensioners
(workers)—are not in the picture. The only missing category of principal,
wealthy private blockholders of shares, already have access to detailed in-
side information by virtue of their close relations with management so it
is doubtful that they gain from FVA in the way the efficiency perspectives
would have it.
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With the agents that gain power being located in the financial sector, a
fuller understanding of FVA needs to consider how that sector operates and
how it relates to the rest of the economy, i.e. the productive sector (which we
take here to include all non-financial services). It has become common to
claim that finance has been disintermediated. On one important level this is
true: in recent decades corporations have come to rely far less on bank loans
(i.e. savings intermediated by banks) to fund their investment. They now go
directly to the capital markets and sell corporate bonds or issue new shares.
In this process, as Sinclair (2005) has shown, the credit rating agencies
have become an exemplar of private authority. However, while this has
reduced the need for some traditional banking activities, it is perhaps too
soon to talk of fully disintermediated finance: The majority of the financial
system’s capital base still comes from relatively fragmented wealth which
is not controlled directly but rather is controlled by intermediaries, the
most important being the funds and the largest international banks. In
other words, while investment risk has been disintermediated (i.e. risk is
passed on directly to the principal), control has not.
The dispersal of risk away from the core financial intermediaries, com-
bined with the retention of financial control by them, is a central feature of
the process broadly referred to by political economists as financialisation.
Building on our reinterpretation of Barlev and Haddad’s analysis earlier,
we now use the controversial accounting standard IAS 39 to demonstrate
that certain aspects of FVA are integral to the ongoing process of financial-
isation.
An important empirical characteristic of financialisation is the steadily
expanding volume of financial assets which has appeared on the balance
sheets of non-financial corporations in recent decades (see Crotty, 2002;
Krippner, 2005). IAS 39, and the earlier US standard upon which it is based,
relate directly to this phenomenon because they prescribe how to measure
financial assets in accounting statements. These standards require that fi-
nancial assets be listed on a company’s balance sheet at their fair values
(either market value or, where an asset is not actively traded, a model of
market value). Furthermore, any changes in those values are carried di-
rectly to the income statement, therefore impacting the company’s profit
or loss result (IASB, 2003).3 Historical analyses of non-financial corpora-
tions in rich-economies show that, on average, they now make as much
as 40% of their net income from financial transactions compared to just
10% in the 1950s and 1960s (Crotty, 2002; Dume´nil and Le´vy, 2004; Epstein
and Power, 2002; Krippner, 2005). In this regard, IAS 39 should be under-
stood as both reflecting and reinforcing the subordination of production
to finance, so that the profits of the productive sector become increasingly
related to movements in financial markets (as opposed to product mar-
kets). This in turn has led to an overall transfer of profitability between
sectors at the macroeconomic level: The creation and trading of a whole
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new range of financial assets in recent decades has been accompanied by a
sharp reversal in fortunes of finance and production to the extent that the
profit-share of the financial sector (as a ratio of GDP) is now larger than
that of the productive sector, despite the financial sector being significantly
smaller by most other measures (see, for example, Krippner, 2005 on the
US and Dumenil and Levy, 2001 on France).
A second characteristic of financialisation, also directly related to FVA,
is the restructuring of corporate activity to meet targets set by the cap-
ital markets, i.e. by the analysts, banks and funds. Froud et al. (2000)
explain how this aspect of financialisation has been fuelled by the rise
of shareholder value, which originated as an add-on to historic cost ac-
counts, introduced in the 1980s by management consultants, with the aim
of incorporating changes in asset values and other forms of future income
into measures of corporate performance. Because the logic of today’s FVA
paradigm corresponds precisely with these aims, FVA’s introduction ef-
fectively institutionalises this second facet of financialisation in the form
of accounting standards. In as much as they are a mirror of shareholder
value, FVA accounting standards thus serve to intensify the transforma-
tion of corporate strategy from ‘retain and reinvest to downsize and distribute’
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000: 17; emphasis added).
In summary, to say that FVA increases efficiency requires not only that
one defines efficiency purely in pecuniary terms (as opposed, for example,
to industrial terms), but also that one measures such pecuniary efficiency
exclusively from the perspective of the financial sector.
3.3 National Differences: FVA and the Varieties of Capitalism
Although the continuing rise of the financial sector has been a phenomenon
of all advanced capitalist societies in recent decades, it affects national eco-
nomic systems to varying degrees, and with very different consequences.
This argument becomes clear, if we examine the implications of FVA from
the perspective of the Varieties of Capitalism debate (Albert, 1991; Hall
and Soskice, 2001). The most widely used and comprehensive version of
the Varieties of Capitalism-model (Hall and Soskice, 2001) is based on two
ideal types: Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) and Liberal Market
Economies (LMEs), which are, respectively, illustrated with the cases of
Germany and the USA.
The defining characteristics of the CME (or ‘Rhenish’) model are the
consensual (for the most part) relationship between labour and capital,
the supporting role of the state, and the availability of patient capital pro-
vided either by major banks (Hausbanken) or from internally generated
funds. These characteristics are seen as conducive to a relatively long-
term perspective with regard to economic decision making in the private
sector. Stable ownership and control structures provide firms, including
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the small and medium-size Mittelstand companies, with considerable pro-
tection against hostile take-overs. All of these factors support the long-
term investment in human resource development that is crucial for CME
specialisation in high skill and quality products based on incremental
innovation.
The second ideal-type, the Liberal Market Economy (or ‘Anglo-Saxon’)
capitalist model, is characterized by more adversarial management–labour
relations, comparatively short-term employment, the predominance of fi-
nancial markets for capital provision, an active market for corporate con-
trol, and an increased emphasis on short-term price movements on stock
markets. This model arguably yields comparative advantages in sectors
with a premium on particularly fast moving and/or capital intensive sec-
tors such as biotechnology and high value-added services. As Section 3.2
makes clear, the shift to FVA serves to reinforce the already powerful role
of finance in the Anglo-Saxon variety of capitalism—both in terms of the
agency of financial analysts/fund managers versus enterprise managers,
and also more structurally at a sectoral level as finance versus production.
However, given the already powerful role of finance in the Anglo-Saxon
type of capitalism, the consequences for the Anglo-Saxon model in this re-
spect are more limited; the introduction of the FVA paradigm is compatible
with, and complementary to, existing political-economic arrangements.
In contrast, within the Rhenish capitalist model, the rise of FVA has
more disruptive consequences. It makes the familiar (Rhenish) practice
of hiding revenues in the balance sheet significantly harder—and thereby
limits the build-up of hidden internal reserves for long-term strategies. In
this regard there is a clear contrast between IFRS and the rather conser-
vative and prudent accounting approach under, for example, the German
Handelsgesetzbuch—which is characterized by low book values of assets,
overstated liabilities and ‘hidden reserves’ (Ball, 2004: 103). This conserva-
tive approach evolved under the influence of the Hausbanken, who were
primarily concerned with ensuring the security of their long-term loans to
enterprises and so took a relatively cautious view of the future, acknowl-
edging its inherent uncertainty.4 However, it is not only the Hausbanken
who are less interested in short-term financial performance and more in-
terested in enduring solvency and stability. The same perspective applies
to other sources of investment capital in the Rhenish model, especially
paid-in owners’ equity which is an important source of funding for the
Mittelstand. In addition, hidden reserves are expedient for enterprise man-
agers since they can be used to smooth-out good and bad years—at least
for a certain period of time—thereby avoiding conflicts with shareholders,
and hence also with workers.5
In the Rhenish model, the introduction of FVA-based accounting stan-
dards takes away the ‘primary accounting tool available to reduce earn-
ings volatility’ (Ball, 2004: 125). Whereas enterprise managers previously
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had considerable discretion over when to recognise unrealized gains and
losses, the fair value approach calls for changes in the capitalized value
of future income to be shown on the balance sheet immediately. Financial
analysts can now exert pressure on enterprise managers to put these re-
sources to more productive, and often rather short-term, uses. While the
move to FVA in both capitalist models is seen to strengthen the position of
shareholders vis-a`-vis managers, in the Rhenish model FVA also impacts
a broader socio-economic arrangement between workers, employers and
other so-called ‘stakeholders’ which was built on the basis of more pru-
dent accounting. Thus, the well-known ‘pressures of short-termism that
plague American and British companies—pressure from shareholders to
maximize dividends by concentrating on quarterly results and short-range
return on investment’ (Sally, 1995: 69) are likely to arrive alongside FVA,
bringing with them a more conflictive relationship between corporations
and representatives of labour.
The potentially destabilizing consequences of the rise of FVA on the
Rhenish variety of capitalism are well-illustrated by IASB accounting stan-
dard IAS 32, and the strong opposition its pending adoption has raised from
the German ‘Mittelstand’. The term ‘Mittelstand’ refers to the small- and
medium-sized, mostly family owned companies that form the backbone of
German industrial production. Such companies are typical of the consen-
sual and long-term perspective of the Rhenish variety of capitalism, based
on close consultation with ‘Hausbanken’ and workers councils. At present,
EU regulations require only publicly-listed companies to use IASB stan-
dards, which makes most ‘Mittelstand’ companies exempt. However, there
is a clear intent on the part of the IASB to extend IFRS to non-listed compa-
nies and thus avoid inconsistency within accounting practises of individ-
ual EU countries (IASB, 2006). Furthermore, many ‘Mittelstand’ companies
would like to use IFRS not only to enable their international customers to
understand them better, but also to access international capital markets
(e.g. private equity capital). Finally, the drive towards an extension of the
application of IFRS is intensified by the forthcoming implementation of the
Basle II capital adequacy accord in 2007 that stipulate an improved valida-
tion of credit risks, preferably on the basis of the internationally accepted
IASB standards.
For ‘Mittelstand’ companies, by far the most controversial standard is
IAS 32, which stipulates how to account for equity capital. The current
version of IAS 32, as revised in 2003, classifies the paid-in capital from
members or partners in a Mittelstand company as a financial liability—
and not as equity—because the capital is, in principle at least, repayable.
In addition, IAS 32 demands that this ‘liability’ is accounted for at fair
value, which in this case is the current market value of the company, based
on future earning expectations by the market. The net effect of IAS 32
will not only be to strip Mittelstand companies of their equity capital, but
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also to substantially increase their liabilities because the fair value of the
company is in most cases much higher than the value of paid in capital. The
expected result is that these companies will find it very difficult to mobilize
new credits, particularly under the risk-sensitive Basle II agreement.
Reclassifying the money that has been invested by the owner families
as long-term debts and assessing the value of these debts based on FVA
would seriously undermine the capital base of many of the more than
900,000 ‘Mittelstand’ companies. In the context of the Basle II agreement
this would dramatically raise their borrowing costs, effectively driving
many to close or sell themselves to larger companies. It is therefore no
surprise that, in recent years, the drafting of IAS 32 has caused massive
protest from German business, leading to critical IASB comment letters
from German associations such as the German Cooperative and Raiffeisen
Confederation (DGRV, 2005) or the German Accounting Standards Com-
mittee (DRSC, 2005). In addition, large family-owned companies such as
Bertelsmann, Freudenberg, Heraeus, Haniel, Oetker and Holtzbrinck are
also similarly affected by this regulation and have thus formed an ad-hoc
group to oppose such an implementation of IAS 32. In this we can see a
clear clash between domestic social constituencies and transnational pri-
vate governance, so far without success for the former (FAZ, 2005), and
where the latter represents the imposition of a unified financial investor
perspective with little apparent regard for the particularities of the institu-
tional structures of differing varieties of capitalism. Changes in accounting
practices thus have the very real potential to threaten the basis of the Rhen-
ish capitalist model since its elements are highly interdependent and not
easily transferred or exchanged.
3.4 Capital Pricing, Income Division and Economic Restructuring
In the preceding sections we argued, in contrast to the rather apolitical
efficiency perspective (Section 3.1), that the shift towards FVA institution-
alises significant changes in the balance of forces between different social
constituencies. In this section we extend our argument by demonstrating
how FVA, through the pricing and validation of new capital assets, can
restructure relations of appropriation among corporations, and also be-
tween these corporations and their respective labour forces. To do this we
draw on a long-standing controversy in the field of economics to critically
examine the logic of IFRS 3, an FVA accounting standard which prescribes
how to measure intangible assets acquired in a corporate takeover.
We start by explaining why the quantity of capital which an economy
employs in production is ultimately an arbitrary magnitude, and how this
reveals the role of accounting in maintaining the illusion of capital as sci-
entifically quantifiable—an illusion which is mutually reinforced by neo-
classical economics. We then combine this analysis with an institutional
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economics perspective on accumulation, to demonstrate that an accounting
standard such as IFRS3, which creates entirely new and inherently unob-
servable assets from little more than economic rents, serves to disguise
appropriation as production and hence lock-in exploitative production re-
lations in the international political economy.
Neoclassical economics attempts to explain how a market economy op-
erates in the following way: (1) Economic output is defined as a function
of the quantities of input factors used in production, the latter usually
being categorized as capital and labour. Each factor of production is as-
sumed to have a marginal productivity. This gives rise to the production
function. (2) The invisible hand of the market optimises an entire economy
by maximising this production function subject to the constrained avail-
ability of capital and labour as expressed by their prices (the interest and
wage rates), which in turn are determined by supply and demand in the
capital and labour markets. In doing this, the market economy determines
the optimal quantities of capital and labour to use, and the division of in-
come between them. For its part, accounting is supposed to provide an
empirical measure, at the level of the firm, of the quantity of capital em-
ployed in production. As such, the social division of income between capi-
tal and labour can be justified by reference to the ‘normal’ rate of return on
assets.
However, the neoclassical logic makes two important, and question-
able, assumptions. The first is that capital is a quantifiable magnitude; the
second is that individual inputs of capital and labour have their own dis-
tinct (marginal) productivities. Without the first assumption, the notion
of a maximisation process—upon which the methodology of neoclassical
economics and modern accounting are both based—becomes untenable.
The second assumption depends on the first; without a quantity, a factor
of production cannot have a marginal productivity. Challenging these two
assumptions was the central focus of the so-called Cambridge Controver-
sies,6 an intense theoretical debate to which neoclassical economics has yet
to provide a robust response (Cohen and Harcourt, 2003). One of the few
accounting scholars to have empirically illustrated the Cambridge Con-
troversies summarises their impact thus: ‘in so far as accounting relies on
marginalism for its theoretical foundations then those foundations are fal-
lacious’ (Tinker, 1980: 147). In this article we only cover what is important
for our analysis of FVA; there are many fuller accounts of the Controversies
and their implications for political economy (for a review of such literature
see Cohen and Harcourt, 2003).
To quantify capital, both accounting (for example Berry, 1999: 333) and
economics (for example Varian, 1996: 192) use money as the unit of mea-
surement. They say that the monetary quantity of any individual capital
asset is the value of expected future income streams arising from owner-
ship of that asset. Future income is discounted to present value using an
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interest rate. This is also the common practise in business and finance. The
critical argument of the Cambridge Controversies was that such a quantity
of capital cannot be optimized, as part of the production function, subject
to its price because in this case the very definition of quantity already in-
corporates price—i.e. the interest rate. Here, neoclassical logic is circular
because the expected income streams which underpin the money value of
a capital asset, and so give it a ‘quantity’, depend not only on estimates of
total income in the future but also depend on an assumed social division
of that income. In other words, rather than explaining the social division of
income, the ‘quantity’ of capital depends on the social division of income.
Realising that the price and quantity of capital were effectively the same
thing, Sraffa demonstrated how ‘the same assortment of capital goods rep-
resents different quantities of capital’ (Sraffa, 1960 as paraphrased in Nitzan
and Bichler, 2000: 72) and in doing so revealed the quantity of capital to be
indeterminate.
From a functionalist standpoint, the purpose of accounting—one might
presume—is to keep an accurate record of who contributes what to pro-
duction and therefore ensure that distribution is fair. In as much as it at-
tempts to meet this purpose, modern accounting relies on the principal of
marginal productivity (why else measure assets?). However, this principal
can be challenged on at least two counts: First, if capital indeed has an
indeterminate quantity, then the marginal productivity of capital (changes
in output divided by changes in the quantity of capital used) is concep-
tually void. Second, in anything other than the most stylized and abstract
examples of socially isolated production, it is not possible to empirically
observe the precise relation between individual inputs and outputs, and
hence it is impossible to verify the marginal output of any single factor of
production. As an influential institutional economist put it nearly a cen-
tury ago, production is not a mechanical process but rather a societal one
whose ‘inputs’ extend as far back into human history as one chooses to
look (Veblen, 1908a: 540).
These neoclassical failings leave a problem: If marginal productivity ei-
ther does not exist, or at least is impossible to measure, then what is left to
explain the different income streams received by the owners of assets, and
their workers? According to Veblen the answer lies in the control of produc-
tion, by ‘means of engrossing the community’s industrial efficiency’ (ibid:
526). The owner of a machine does not receive income because of the innate
productivity of his machine per se (which can anyway not be observed),
but rather because control of that machine—in a given industrial phase—
effectively controls society’s ability to put its own accumulated knowledge
into motion. Controlling the machine amounts to a bottleneck in produc-
tion, not a contribution to production. This control allows the appropriation
of economic rents which can be capitalized as an asset, the ownership of
which then forms the basis of capitalist accumulation. The asset relates
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primarily to a power relation, not a physical machine. As Nitzan puts it
‘accumulation is not an offshoot of production, but rather an interaction
between productivity and power’ (Nitzan, 1998: 174). This power is the power
to appropriate and it is not unique to the present historical period. In feu-
dal times it was expressed coercively; under capitalism it is expressed as
an asset presented as having productivity, validated by accounting, and
accepted by most of society as such.
What has this got to do with FVA? Quite a lot because in the current
phase of capitalism there is an increasing volume of rents which cannot be
traced to recognisable assets. Before IFRS 3, these rents were capitalized
by stock markets in share prices, but not validated by accounting as as-
sets. The resulting gap between the stock market value of a company and
the accounting value of its assets is not openly referred to as appropria-
tion but instead labelled goodwill. This so-called goodwill gap has grown
sharply in recent decades (Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Zambon, 2002) in line
with structural changes in the international political economy such as the
financialisation referred to in Section 3.2. In a departure from historic cost
accounting, FVA in the form of the IASB’s standard IFRS 3 now demands
that goodwill acquired in a takeover become a permanent accounting as-
set7 whose inclusion on the balance sheet is supported by expectations of
future cash flows (IASB, 2004c).
IFRS 3’s new form of goodwill accounting is justified by many on
the basis that technological change has created a new intangible econ-
omy and that goodwill represents intangible assets which accounting
has not yet managed to measure separately. Indeed a specially commis-
sioned EU study on intangible assets defines them broadly as ‘non-physical
sources of future economic benefits’ (European Commission, 2003: 18).
Non-productive factors such as monopoly, market knowledge and trade
secrets therefore actually become assets—these three examples are taken di-
rectly from the same EU study. This is extremely important because, in the
context of a political-economy dominated by market logic and the ideas of
neoclassical economics, the notion of an asset is socially very influential.
In accounting terms, the capitalisation of goodwill converts super-normal
profits into a ‘normal’ rate of return on assets, since the firm’s asset base
is—at a stroke—expanded. Reducing the apparent rate of return on as-
sets negatively impacts the bargaining position of labour, regardless of the
source of the original ‘goodwill’. Furthermore, because goodwill is a resid-
ual, the assets created by IFRS 3 could be intellectual capital symptomatic of
the so-called ‘knowledge economy’ (Canibano et al., 1999), but they could
equally be capitalized profits caused by a successful squeeze on wages! In
our reading, accounting has not yet developed a reliable way to tell the
difference. Politically therefore, the capitalisation of goodwill institution-
alises appropriation; appropriation is made to look like capital-intensive
production.
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Table 1 Categories of social constituencies affected by FVA-related changes
Perspective Winner Loser
Mainstream Accounting Shareholders, society
at large
Management
Finance versus Production Financial sector Productive sector,
especially enterprise
managers
Varieties of Capitalism Anglo-Saxon Rhenish
Capital Pricing Approach ‘Knowledge Economy’
(knowledge capital)
Industrial capital
Waged labour
3.5 Overview: Perspectives on Fair Value Accounting
Taken together, each of the three different political economy perspectives
that we have outlined earlier gives a different but complementary inter-
pretation of the shift to FVA—and they all contrast with the perspective of
mainstream accounting (Table 1).
In the preceding sections we have explained how current changes
in accounting standards both reflect and reinforce the power bal-
ance between different socio-economic constituencies. From a politi-
cal economy-perspective this immediately raises questions about how
these new standards were able to get such authority, and so quickly.
Moreover, why have those social constituencies which lose from the
political-economic reconfiguration of which these standards are a part,
not prevented them? Our answer to these questions highlights the role of
transnational private authority as the chosen mode of governance for in-
ternational accounting standard setting. In order to substantiate this point,
Section 4 puts the regulation of accounting standards by the IASB into the
perspective of debates about different public and private modes of gover-
nance. Subsequently, for each of the perspectives outlined earlier, Section
5 demonstrates how this private mode of governance privileges certain
constituencies above others.
4. THE TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE GOVERNANCE
OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
The regulation of accounting has attracted considerable attention by
(global) governance scholars (cf. Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 121;
Germain, 2004: 15; Sassen, 1999: 413; Strange, 1996: 135–46; Woods, 2002:
31). The attraction of the topic is obvious—in hardly any other case has such
wide-ranging authority been delegated to a private body. Since January
2005 some 7,000 European listed companies have been subject to the IFRS
of the private International Accounting Standards Board whereas statu-
tory accounting standards in the EU were previously regulated at national
level. Furthermore, the regulation of accounting was largely a public task,
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although the accountancy profession has always played an active part in
developing the details of regulation. In Germany, for example, accounting
rules were contained within the Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB), i.e. company
law, from the eighteenth century onwards (see Gulin et al., 2004).
Cross-border economic transactions soon made the need for interna-
tional harmonisation obvious. While Napoleon’s Code de Commerce of
1809 arguably was the basis of the first phase of harmonisation, this pro-
cess was given new impetus in the late twentieth century. Within the
European Union two directives on accounting regulation were adopted
in 1978 and 1983, while the International Accounting Standards Commit-
tee was disseminating ‘best practice’ on a broader—but only voluntary—
basis. Nevertheless, the EU decision to make IFRS binding for all publicly
listed European firms from 2005 was the first major international stan-
dardisation. This decision marks a significant ‘shift in governance’ (van
Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2004) towards the private and transnational
level, although we are still some distance from what can be termed ‘purely
private regulation’. International Accounting Standards may be set by a
private organisation and monitored by private firms (i.e. the Big Four8
accountants), but within the EU they must still be endorsed by public
authority, in this case the European Commission and the Accounting Reg-
ulatory Committee. Nevertheless, the EU bases its endorsement decisions
on regular advice from the private-sector European Financial Reporting
Advisory Group (EFRAG) which is itself an umbrella network of organisa-
tions representing European employers, banks, accountancy professions,
insurers, stock exchanges and financial analysts.
The transfer of regulatory competence from the national to the transna-
tional sphere is also not yet complete. While many countries currently are
applying or moving to adopt IFRS, the US remains the most substantial
gap in the coverage of internationally standardized accounting standards.
However, the IASB and FASB are involved in an ongoing convergence
project (‘Norwalk Agreement’) that strives for a harmonisation of account-
ing regulation on a nearly global level (see IASB, 2002).
Although the private mode of governance is frequently discussed as a
rather technical question of institutional design, it is certainly not neutral
in political-economic terms. Here we depart from the governance main-
stream, by emphasizing that shifts in the substance of regulation (towards
FVA) may not properly be understood without taking shifts in the mode of
regulation (towards transnational private governance) into account, and
vice versa. But we are also aware that our explanation of current shifts in the
substance of regulation is yet incomplete, as it does not incorporate broader
contextual factors such as shifting patterns of trade and production. Simi-
larly, the change in the mode of regulation—i.e. why the European Union
has adapted the IASB standards—has yet to be accounted for, taking the
task of explanation a step further. Nevertheless, by putting the issue of
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private regulation in the context of the different theoretical perspectives
outlined earlier, we hope to contribute to a more comprehensive explana-
tion of current shifts in both the substance and the mode of regulation.
5. THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE
AUTHORITY
5.1 The Institutional Efficiency of Transnational Private Authority
Why have the productive sector and its enterprise managers not success-
fully contested the shift to FVA? The paradigm is an instrument of increased
control of production by finance so one would logically expect some re-
sistance from productive enterprise managers. Indeed there have been a
number of critical statements about the IASB’s introduction of FVA (see
for example FT, 2005b,c), but so far these have not lead to the mobilisation
of a powerful opposition.
Our focus on the transnational private governance of accounting regula-
tion indicates three complementary answers to this question, all departing
from the market efficiency argument which is central to mainstream anal-
ysis in the academic disciplines of economics and accounting (see Section
3.1). First, managers are very much in favour of transnational, as opposed
to national, regulation of accounting standards. In order to have better
access to global capital markets many enterprise managers anyway have
to accept the accounting regulations of other countries besides their own.
Accordingly there are obvious savings in compliance costs under a set of
global, or at least regional, standards such as those offered by the IASB.
Second, private authority is preferred in this perspective because of its as-
sumed speed and flexibility, in particular with regard to the accounting
treatment of fast-changing fields of business such as financial instruments
and the ‘New Economy’ of intangible assets. In contrast, public intergov-
ernmental regulation by an international accountancy regime or even an
‘International Accountancy Organization’, perhaps under the auspices of
the United Nations, would be considered too slow and cumbersome. Lastly,
public regulation might also bring in ‘political’ considerations that are not
based on a narrowly conceived efficiency perspective. Thus, there are a
number of self-serving reasons for enterprise managers to accept account-
ing regulation by transnational private authority. However, in accepting
the authority of the IASB they also have to accept what is perceived to
be the most efficient accounting regulation (i.e. fair value accounting), as
defined by experts drawn from the current mainstream of economics and
accounting. Based on the efficiency perspective, any attempt to deviate
from this mainstream consensus can be derided as being ‘political’ or as
one authority on accounting standards puts it ‘. . . self-interested consider-
ations or pleadings by preparers and others that may be detrimental to the
interests of investors and other users [of IFRS]’ (Zeff, 2002: 43).
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5.2 Transnational Private Authority and the Rise of the Financial Sector
From a less functionalist and also less benign perspective, the shift of ac-
counting regulation to the private IASB has been caused by the sheer dom-
inance of a highly organized financial sector which plays an increasingly
prominent role in setting the agenda for managing the European (and
world) economy. There are several avenues by which the economic power
of this sector translates directly into influence on the substance and mode
of accounting regulation. Firstly, it can simply use its lobbying prowess,
both for transferring the task of EU accountancy regulation to the IASB,
and then for the directing the substantive content of regulation towards
the FVA paradigm. Secondly, while the politics of IASB adoption by the
EU still await a more comprehensive study (see also Section 5.3), network
analysis of IASB and EFRAG committee membership reveals that financial
sector actors are by far the best connected and most represented in the
standard-setting network (Perry and No¨lke, 2005).
Membership of IASB committees is formally awarded on the basis of a
members’ ability to offer independent expert knowledge. However, follow-
ing Gramsci’s notion of the organic intellectual (Gramsci, 1971), we view
experts as political actors whose preferences set the ‘technical’ agenda and
define the range of possible outcomes in a decision making process. Ex-
pert knowledge is itself always political because it is always acquired in
a particular social context, and reflects the political-economic structures
and social relations which generated and which reproduce that context.
Each expert uses his or her own theoretical approach to produce technical
solutions, which is why they are seen as experts. As Robert Cox puts it,
‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox, 1981: 128). In
other words, technical solutions are never purely technical; they always
have a political purpose even if those propagating the solutions are not
fully aware of it. Therefore, while the experts on IASB committees may be
independent in as much as they do not consciously make decisions to serve
their material interests, the social context in which such expert knowledge
has been acquired and practised is critical in determining which technical
solution of the many possible ones is produced. In the cases of IASB and
EFRAG committee membership, Perry and No¨lke (2005) find that this so-
cial context is predominantly a financial one: In the governance network
which links 131 companies and organisations to IASB and EFRAG com-
mittees, there are almost twice as many ties with the financial sector as
there are with the productive sector.
5.3 Transnational Private Authority and the Disembedding
of Institutionalized Economies
From the Varieties of Capitalism perspective, the shift in accounting regu-
lation should be seen as part of the ongoing process of structural change
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(or adaptation) of Rhenish capitalism. Among the divergent analyses of
the current restructuring of Rhenish capitalism, it is widely agreed that the
decision of Daimler-Benz to be quoted on the New York Stock Exchange
is of major symbolic importance (Ball, 2004; Dewing and Russell, 2004).
The move by Daimler-Benz signalled not only a change from bank to stock
exchange financing, but also the increasing possibility that US-Generally
Accepted Accounting Practice (US GAAP) would be adopted as de-facto
global accounting standards. At the same time it highlighted the need for a
substantial harmonisation of accounting standards since, under US GAAP,
Daimler Benz was deemed to have made substantial losses in contrast to
the profits it had claimed under German HGB standards. The prospect of
ceding control of the accounting regulation of large multinational compa-
nies to the US standard setter was a significant factor in the EU’s decision to
adopt IASB accounting regulations from 2005 (Dewing and Russell, 2004:
293–4). By closely connecting the IASB to the EU, and institutionalizing the
consultation mechanism through EFRAG, it was hoped that European ac-
tors could influence the substantive development of the new IFRS. Certain
categories of actors have apparently been more successful in this regard
than others. Productive sector enterprise managers, particularly those from
continental Europe have apparently been unable to prevent the introduc-
tion of FVA. German companies in particular are clearly dissatisfied with
their national organisation for accounting, the ‘Deutsche Rechnungslegung
Standards Committee’ (DRSC), as indicated by a massive reorganisation
in March 2003. Questions of institutional design may play a role here,
but there is also the structural factor of nationally organized interest in-
termediation within Rhenish capitalism. Although not straightforwardly
macro-corporatist, business actors in the Rhenish model, are traditionally
accustomed to articulating and negotiating their interests on a national
level with their national government and other interest groups. In the con-
text of transnational private regulation this can be a severe disadvantage
compared to financial actors and coordination service firms (see Cutler
et al., 1999: 10) from the Anglo-Saxon mould, which are well-adapted to in-
terest intermediation in the transnational sphere. Somewhat ironically, the
EU’s move to assert itself in the battle for global accounting standards has
led to a large scale dismantling of dominant accounting regulations within
most of the member states, in favour of practices that can be conceived as
being part of a US hegemony (Dewing and Russell, 2004: 311–3).
5.4 Transnational Private Authority and the Isolation of Accounting
Standard Setting from Society
The Varieties of Capitalism literature highlights the varying degrees of
access of different social constituencies to transnational economic gover-
nance. This analysis can be taken a step further by situating the IASB in the
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context of the relationship between capital and labour. As we explained
in Section 3.4 earlier, by capitalising economic rents as assets, the FVA
paradigm could institutionalise new divisions of income in society, to the
disadvantage of labour. Admittedly, it is doubtful that capital pricing con-
troversies feature prominently on the radar screens of the average trade
union, but nevertheless by shifting the regulation of accounting standards
away from public deliberation in parliaments (i.e. away from bodies of
law such as the German Handelsgesetzbuch) to transnational private ‘ex-
pert’ bodies, economic discourse becomes yet more isolated from broader
debate. Correspondingly, the implications of the shift to FVA for the rela-
tionship between capital and labour go completely unnoticed and do not
become the object of societal contestation.
A good indicator for the current societal isolation of the setting of ac-
counting standards is the low participation rate of organisations outside
the business sector within the IASB comment letter process. A survey of
the comment letter process on all IFRS exposure drafts published on the
IASB website as of August 2004 demonstrates that, of the 900 organisations
participating in the process, none can be identified as a trade union or an
international association of trade unions (Perry and No¨lke, 2005), nor do
any such organisations have representatives on the committees of the IASB
or EFRAG. Although not each comment letter can and will be heeded by
the IASB, the complete absence of trade unions from the central deliber-
ation process over international accounting standards is still astonishing.
This is despite the fact that, during the period surveyed, the IASB issued
exposure drafts relating to labour-sensitive issues such as share-based pay-
ments and employee benefits (ibid). Similarly, no such organisations have
representatives on the committees of the IASB or EFRAG, thereby further
institutionalizing the dominance of the business interests in the accounting
arena.
5.5 Overview: Perspectives on Transnational Private Authority
and the Rise of Fair Value Accounting
This section of the article has taken each of the four perspectives which
we used to analyse the substance of accounting, and applied them to the
governance of accounting (Table 2).
In contrast with the more institutionalist literature on transnational
private authority we claim that there is limited utility in analysing the
mode of regulation without paying due attention to its effects on the
substance of such regulation. In the case of accounting standards, an
important consequence of transnational private authority is to privilege
a financial perspective on measuring economic activity, while also re-
stricting discussion of accounting standards to the realm of technical
efficiency.
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Table 2 Relationship between transnational private authority and substance of
accounting regulation
Perspective Role of transnational private authority
Mainstream Accounting Efficiency advantages of global and private
regulation
Finance versus Production Voice to financial actors, via role of experts
Varieties of Capitalism Weak representation of nationally institutionalized
economic interests
Capital Pricing Approach Further isolation of accounting/economic
discourse from society
6. CONCLUSION
Our analysis has shown that, rather than merely adjusting the way cor-
porate assets are measured, today’s incarnation of Fair Value Accounting
(FVA) also brings new and contentious classes of asset to the forefront of
the international political economy. Section 3 demonstrated how this re-
flects and reinforces changed relations of production in which the financial
sector increasingly dominates the productive sector, nationally institution-
alized economic systems are undermined, and new forms of economic ap-
propriation are validated. In Sections 4 and 5 we then linked substance to
governance to make the case that, through a transnational private body, the
mode of governance has contributed to the recent rise of the FVA paradigm.
Accounting is not a purely technical matter; accounting numbers provide
some of the key economic anchors around which social relations are struc-
tured. As we have shown, accounting standards cannot be reduced to ques-
tions of efficiency since they set out to quantify and compare things which,
by their very nature, are neither quantifiable nor directly comparable. Be-
cause of this accounting standards are political, regardless of whether they
are recognized as such, and play a central role in shaping the future path
of our market-oriented societies.
However, it should be noted that this future path is inherently uncertain
and the new accounting discourse might not lead to the outcome expected
by its proponents. FVA brings many potential risks to accounting, most
notably the way in which the paradigm compresses an expected vision of
the future into present values, which can subsequently become mistaken
for economic reality. Here the corporate failure of US energy giant Enron
provides an instructive example. Even though the Enron case was pri-
marily related to auditing rather than accounting standards, a substantial
part of the fraud resulted from compressing the future into the present
in much the same way as FVA now attempts. This should alert us to the
dangers of privileging such an accounting technique above more broadly
based social measures which are less ‘efficient’ only in so far as they are not
quantifiable.
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NOTES
1 The IASB has recently started using the term International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) instead of International Accounting Standards (IAS). To avoid
confusion, when referring collectively to all IASB standards currently in force,
we use the single term IFRS in this paper. This includes previously issued IAS
which are still in force.
2 We owe this point to one of three anonymous referees of an earlier version of
this article.
3 Notwithstanding two temporary ‘carve outs’ (exemptions) from IAS 39 won by
the European banking sector (Grant, 2005). Neither of these exemptions change
the finance–productive sector relations with which this part of our analysis is
concerned.
4 We owe this point to one of three anonymous referees of an earlier version of
this article.
5 For a more comprehensive historical debate of the advocacy of accounting
philosophies by different socio-economic groups in Germany see Richard (2005).
6 The term ‘Cambridge Controversies’ refers to a long debate between economists
in Cambridge, England and Cambridge, Massachusetts from the mid-1950s to
the mid-1970s (see Cohen and Harcourt, 2003). Although the dates might imply
that the debate was resolved, the recent article by Cohen and Harcourt concludes
otherwise.
7 To maintain consistency between accounts it is also expected that equivalent
accounting treatment will have to be applied to goodwill generated internally
by a corporation (Bromwich, 2004; FT, 2006).
8 The Big Four global accountancy firms are PriceWaterHouseCoopers (PWC),
Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, and KPMG.
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APPENDIX
Accounting is conventionally seen as aiming to measure two things: wealth and
profit. Each year a firm produces two core financial statements: the balance sheet
and the income statement. The first of these is supposed to measure wealth, the
second is supposed to measure profit.
Balance sheet: Wealth = Assets − Liabilities
Income statement: Profit = Revenue − Expenditure
It is important to remember that—conceptually—wealth is a stock and so the
balance sheet is written for a particular date: it is a spot measure; a snapshot in
time. In contrast, income is a flow therefore the income statement is for a particular
year: it is a period measure. Nevertheless, the balance sheet and income statement
are logically related because wealth on a particular date is equal to wealth at an
earlier date plus profit made between the two dates. For example:
Wealth at the end of 2004 = Wealth at the end of 2003 + Profit during 2004
Wealth1 = Wealth0 + Profit1 (1)
Equation (1) can be rearranged as:
Profit1 = Wealth1 − Wealth0 (2)
This logic implies two different approaches to measuring profit. The first is driven
by the income statement, and corresponds to traditional historic cost accounting;
the second is driven by the balance sheet and corresponds to the Fair Value Ac-
counting (FVA) approach.
Historic cost accounting:
Profit = Revenue − Expenditure (income statement)
Fair value accounting: Profit = Wealth1 − Wealth0 (balance sheet)
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